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1. INTRODUCTION 
Computationalism has been a fruitful and broad research tradition in cog-
nitive research. Its main commitment is to claim that the brain is a kind of 
information-processing mechanism, and that information-processing is neces-
sary for cognition. Notably, the radical view that computation is both suf-
ficient and necessary for cognition is rarely accepted1 because it implies that 
any computer is already a cognitive system, and this view is counterintuitive, 
particularly since such a machine may be engaged only in utterly trivial 
operations. In this paper, however, I do not wish to enter the debate on the 
issue of whether there is a single correct view on the nature of cognition for 
all cognitive science disciplines (but see: MIŁKOWSKI 2013; AKAGI 2017). 
The positive view will not be developed here. In particular, the full 
account of physical computation will be set aside because it has already been 
elucidated in book-length accounts (FRESCO 2014; MIŁKOWSKI 2013; PICCINI 
2015). For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to say that the current con-
sensus among realists about physical computation is, roughly, that it occurs 
always and only in physical mechanisms whose function is to compute, or to 
process vehicles of information (understood as degrees of freedom of a 
physical medium); in the case of cognitive systems, these vehicles may also 
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bear semantic information. Instead of elaborating on this account further, 
a review of objections is offered below, as no other comprehensive survey is 
available. However, the review presented below may not encompass all kinds 
of objections to computationalism. Hopefully, the most popular kinds of 
objections are included. 
The survey suggests that the majority of objections fail because they 
make computationalism a straw man. A number of them are, at best, red 
herrings. Some of them, however, have shown that stronger versions of com-
putationalism are untenable, as well. Historically, they have helped to shape 
the theory and methodology of computational modeling. In particular, 
a number of objections show that cognitive systems are not only computers, 
or that computation is not the sole condition of cognition. This objection is 
already incorporated in the formulation of the main commitment above; no 
objection, however, establishes that there might be cognition without com-
putation. The objections are ordered in the following way: (1) as related to 
the (supposed) nature of computers; (2) as related to semantics; (3) against 
computational functionalism; (4) as related to physical computation. In the 
conclusion, I briefly summarize the state of the debate. 
2. OBJECTIONS RELATED 
TO THE (SUPPOSED) NATURE OF COMPUTERS 
COMPUTER METAPHOR IS JUST A METAPHOR 
A computational description of a cognitive system is sometimes described 
as a computer metaphor. The use of the term suggests that the proposed 
description is rough and highly idealized; thus, it cannot be treated literally. 
For example, Karl Friston writes about the mathematical formulation of the 
free-energy principle in the following way: “Crucially, under some simpli-
fying assumptions, these variational schemes can be implemented in a bio-
logically plausible way, making them an important metaphor for neuronal pro-
cessing in the brain.” (FRISTON 2012, 2101; see also, e.g., EKMAN 2003). As 
such, this is not an objection to computationalism. Obviously, all kinds of 
scientific models use idealizations. However, by using the term, others suggest 
that no computational model may be treated seriously; all are mere metaphors 
(DAUGMAN 1990, 9–18). 
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A defender of computationalism might concede this and weaken his posi-
tion to say that idealizations inherent in computational modeling are mis-
leading. But the position is also tenable in the stronger version (NEWELL & 
SIMON 1972; PYLYSHYN 1984, xiv–xvi). This is because computer metaphors 
cannot really be tested and rejected, whereas computational models can. The 
objection, in other words, fails. It is also confused: all scientific models are 
idealized, which does not make them metaphorical. 
SOFTWARE IS NOT IN THE HEAD 
This objection is that there is no simple way to understand the notions of 
software and hardware as applied to biological brains. But the software/ 
hardware distinction, popular in the slogan “the mind is to the brain like 
software is to hardware” (BLOCK 1995; PICCININI 2010), need not be applic-
able to brains at all for computationalism to be true. This objection is prob-
ably based on a conflation of stored-program computers with all possible 
kinds of computers. There are non-program-controllable computers: they do 
not load programs from external memory to internal memory in order to 
execute them. A mundane example of such a computer is a logical AND 
gate. In other words, while it may be interesting to inquire whether there is 
software in the brain, even if there were none, computationalism could still 
be true. This objection, therefore, fails. 
COMPUTERS ARE JUST FOR NUMBER-CRUNCHING 
Another intuitive objection, already stated (and defeated) in the 1950s, is that 
brains are not engaged in number-crunching, while computers compute over 
numbers. But if this is all computers do, then they don’t control missiles or send 
documents to printers. After all, printing is not just number crunching. The ob-
jection rests, therefore, on a mistaken assumption that computers can only 
compute numerical functions. Computer functions can be defined not only by 
integer numbers but also through arbitrary symbols (NEWELL 1980), and, as 
physical mechanisms, computers can also control other physical processes. 
COMPUTERS ARE ABSTRACT ENTITIES 
Some claim that, because symbols in computers are, in some sense, abs-
tract and formal, computers — or at least computer programs — are abstract 
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as well (LAKOFF 1987; BARRETT 2016; BARRETT, POLLET, & STULP 2014). In 
other words, the opponents of computationalism claim that it implies 
ontological dualism (SEARLE 1990). However, computers are physical me-
chanisms, and they can be broken, set on fire etc. These things may be dif-
ficult to accomplish with a collection of abstract entities. Computers are not 
just symbol-manipulators. They do things, and some of the things they do 
are not computational. In this minimal sense, computers are physically em-
bodied, not unlike mammal brains. This objection is, therefore, false. It is, 
however, a completely different matter whether the symbols in computers 
have any meaning. 
PEOPLE ARE ORGANISMS, COMPUTERS ARE NOT 
Louise Barrett (2016), among others, presses the point that people are 
organisms. It is trivially true, but irrelevant without further specification: phy-
sical computers are physical, and they may be built in various ways. 
A computer may be built of DNA strands (ZAUNER & CONRAD 1996), so why 
claim that it is metaphysically impossible to have a biological computer? 
Another way to spell out this objection is to say that biological brains, 
thanks to their unique biological structure, give rise to features necessarily 
absent in computers.2 In other words, features of life are somehow necessary 
for cognition, maybe because wherever there is cognition, there is life 
(THOMPSON 2007). It could be argued, for example, that only processes 
occurring in living organisms can lead to the emergence of normativity, 
which, in turn, is required in order to evaluate the accuracy of mental 
representations. Some authors claim, for instance, that biological functions 
are required to account for such normativity, and that artifacts, such as 
computers, necessarily lack it, because these artifacts are not far from their 
thermodynamic equilibrium; hence, they need not maintain their own far-
from-equilibrium state (BICKHARD 2009; DEACON 2012). This is an interest-
ing claim, but it does not constitute a strong objection to the version of 
computationalism assumed widely in the cognitive science. Only its very 
radical proponents would say that computation is both necessary and suf-
ficient for cognition. If computation is just necessary, then biological func-
tionality may also be required, and this objection is not at all plausible. To 
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make it plausible, one would have to show that life excludes computation, 
which is absurd. People really can compute and perform mathematical proofs 
without dying. 
Moreover, it is far from clear that one cannot build a biological computer, 
in the sense that it would be far from its thermodynamic equilibrium. 
Preserving the far-from-equilibrium state does not require cognition, either. 
A wax candle, while burning, does maintain such a state, and it remains du-
bious that a more complex organization, which could organize the system to 
maintain its far-from-equilibrium state (making it ultrastable, as cybernetics 
calls it (FROESE & STEWART 2010)), cannot occur in systems engaged in 
computational processing. 
The objection can be, however, understood in a slightly different vein, as 
implying that the very structure of biological brains gives them particularly 
important powers that are lacking in computational artifacts. For example, 
Daniel Dennett has recently interpreted Terrence Deacon’s objection against 
computationalism as implying that one should look at biological features 
such as the lack of clear-cut hierarchies and bureaucratic divisions of labor 
in the brain. Instead of positing simplistic and biologically unrealistic “polit-
buro” hierarchies, one should include the role of the competition and noise 
in the brain (DENNETT 2017). Note, however, that Dennett does not consider 
this as an objection to computationalism, unlike Deacon. Nothing logically 
precludes building such computers if they turn out to be, for example, 
energetically more efficient (even if the price for the efficiency is a lack of 
thermodynamic stability). 
Yet another way of putting this objection is to say that computationalism 
has to ignore the embodiment of cognition. Although it is not entirely clear 
that embodied cognition is as fecund an approach to cognition as many claim 
(GOLDINGER et al. 2016), the mechanistic approach to computation implies 
that cognitive mechanisms have to be understood as embedded in a larger 
environment (MIŁKOWSKI 2017) and may be realized using bodily structures, 
which may go beyond the neural system (MIŁKOWSKI 2012; NOWAKOWSKI 
2017). Again, computationalism does not say that the body is not required 
for cognition. It only says that computation is necessary, and it is plausible to 
think that biological information-processing mechanisms mesh with bodily 
processes and structures. In short, this objection is just a red herring. 
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COMPUTER MODELS IGNORE TIME 
Proponents of dynamical accounts of cognition stress that Turing ma-
chines do not operate in real time. This means that this classical model of 
computation does not appeal to real time; instead, it operates with the abs-
tract notion of a computation step. There is no continuous time flow, just 
discrete clock ticks in a Turing machine (BICKHARD & TERVEEN 1995; WHEELER 
2005). This is true. But is this an objection to computationalism? 
First, some models of computation appeal to real time (NAGY & AKL 
2011), so one could use such a formalism. Second, the objection seems to 
confuse the formal model of computation with its physical realization. Phy-
sical computers operate in real time, and not all models of computation are 
made equal; some will be relevant to the explanation of cognition, and some 
may only be useful for computability theory. A mechanistically-adequate 
model of computation that describes all relevant causal processes in the 
mechanism is required for explanatory purposes (MIŁKOWSKI 2014). This 
objection is, again, a red herring; the debate about computationalism does 
not depend on modeling time in computers. 
BRAINS ARE NOT DIGITAL COMPUTERS 
Universal Turing machines are crucial to computability theory, and these 
are digital machines. One could, however, maintain that brains are not digi-
tal computers (EDELMAN 1992; LUPYAN 2013). But computationalism can 
appeal to models of analog computation (for example, SIEGELMANN & SON-
TAG 1994), or even more complex kinds of computation (PICCININI & BAHAR 
2013), if required. These models are still understood as computational in 
computability theory, and some theorists indeed claim that the brain is an 
analog computer, which is supposed to allow them to compute Turing-
incomputable functions. Thus, one cannot dismiss all kinds of computatio-
nalism by saying that the brain is not a digital computer. There are analog 
computers, and an early model of a neural network, Perceptron, was analog 
(ROSENBLATT 1958). The contention that computers have to be digital is just 
dogmatic or purely verbal. This objection is, therefore, mistaken (and some-
times also a red herring); computationalism does not assume digitality. 
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3. OBJECTIONS RELATED TO SEMANTICS 
SYMBOLS IN COMPUTERS MEAN NOTHING 
One of the most powerful objections formulated against the possibility of 
Artificial Intelligence is associated with John Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room 
thought experiment. Searle claimed to show that running a computer pro-
gram was not sufficient for semantic properties to arise, and this was in clear 
contradiction to what had been earlier advanced by proponents of artificial 
intelligence (AI), who assumed that it was sufficient to simulate the syn-
tactic structure of representations for the semantic properties to appear. As 
John Haugeland quipped: “if you take care of syntax, the semantics will take 
care of itself” (HAUGELAND 1985, 106). But Searle replied that one can easily 
imagine a person with a special set of instructions in English who could 
manipulate Chinese symbols and answer questions in Chinese without 
understanding it at all. Hence, understanding is not reducible to syntactic 
manipulation. While the discussion around this thought experiment is hardly 
conclusive (PRESTON & BISHOP 2002), the problem was soon reformulated by 
Stevan Harnad (1990) as “the symbol grounding problem” (SGP): How can 
symbols in computational machines mean anything? 
If the SGP makes sense, then one cannot simply assume that symbols in 
computers mean something simply by being part of computers, or at least 
they cannot mean anything outside the computer so easily (even if they 
arguably contain instructional information, at least in stored-program com-
puters — FRESCO & WOLF 2013). Many (though not all — SHAGRIR 2010; 
2011; DRESNER 2010) defenders of computationalism admit that representa-
tional properties do not necessarily exist in physical computational mecha-
nisms (EGAN 1995; FRESCO 2010; PICCININI 2008; MIŁKOWSKI 2013). So, even 
if Searle is right and there is no “intrinsic” semantics in computers, the brain 
might still be a computer, as computers need no semantics to be computers. 
Perhaps something additional to computation is required for semantics. But 
admitting this does not undermine computationalism. 
There is an important connection between the computational theory of 
mind and the representational account of cognition: they are more attractive 
when both are embraced. Cognitive science frequently explains cognitive 
phenomena by referring to semantic properties of mechanisms capable of 
information-processing (SHAGRIR 2010). Brains are assumed to model reality, 
and these models can be utilized in computations. While this seems plausible 
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to many, one can remain computationalist without assuming representatio-
nalism (the claim that cognition requires cognitive representation). At the 
same time, a plausible account of cognitive representation cannot be couched 
merely in computational terms, as long as one assumes that the symbol 
grounding problem makes sense at least for some computers. To make the 
account plausible, most theorists of representation appeal to notions of teleo-
logical function and semantic information (MILLIKAN 1984; DRETSKE 1986; 
BICKHARD 2009; CUMMINS & ROTH 2012), which are not technical terms of 
computability theory, nor can be reduced to such. However, processing of 
semantic information is still processing of information. Hence, computation 
is necessary for manipulation of cognitive representation. Instead of under-
mining computationalism, Searle’s objection seems to vindicate it. 
Computationalism has been strongly connected to cognitive representa-
tions by the fact that it offered a solution to the problem of what makes 
meaning causally relevant. Many theorists claim that because the syntax in 
computer programs is causally relevant (or efficacious), so is the meaning. 
While the wholesale reduction of meaning to syntax is implausible, the com-
putational theory of mind makes it clear that the answer to the question 
includes the causal role of computational vehicles’ syntax. Still, the fact that 
it does not offer a naturalistic account of meaning is not an objection to 
computationalism itself. That would indeed be too much. At the same time, 
at least some naturalistic accounts, such as Millikan’s and Dretske’s, can be 
used to solve the SGP. 
This objection is, therefore, plausible in some sense, but does not go 
against computationalism. It is a red herring, even if the debate over re-
presentation that it started is serious. Indeed, representational properties of 
computation should not be taken for granted. The semantics will not take 
care of itself when there is only syntax in place. 
COGNITION IS NOT ALL SYMBOLIC 
This objection might as well be true. Note that computationalism need not 
say anything about symbols. Moreover, the notion of the symbol in cognitive 
science has been notoriously ambiguous, since it has been used to mean 
various things, including tokens over a finite alphabet of the Turing machine, 
LISP data structures, pointers to data structures, variables standing for targets 
of natural language nouns, mental representations whose meaning is not 
related to the form of their vehicles, and more (MIŁKOWSKI 2013, chap. 4). But 
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there is no special reason for a computationalist to defend the notion that 
cognition has to be symbolic in either of the above senses. It suffices that 
there are vehicles of information (understood in terms of degrees of free-
dom). This objection is a red herring concerning computationalism. 
COMPUTERS CAN ONLY REPRESENT WITH ALL DETAIL 
The debate over meaning in computers and animals abounds with other 
red herrings, however. One recent example is Robert Epstein (2016). His most 
striking mistake is the assumption that computers always represent everything 
with arbitrary accuracy. Epstein cites the example of the way in which 
people remember a dollar bill. He assumes that computers would represent it 
in a photographic manner with all available detail, in contrast to how people 
do it (but he seems to ignore the existence of people with excellent and appa-
rently unbounded memory—LURIJA 2002). This is obviously false: representa-
tion is useful mostly when it does not convey information about all proper-
ties of the represented target. If Epstein is correct, then there are no JPEG files 
in computers, as they are not accurate, because they are based on lossy 
compression. Moreover, no assumption of the computational theory of mind 
says that memory should be understood in terms of the von Neumann 
architecture, and it is controversial to suggest that it should, as some theorists 
claim (GALLISTEL & KING 2010). This objection is, therefore, a red herring. 
PEOPLE DON’T PROCESS INFORMATION 
Ecological psychologists stress that people do not process information, 
but merely pick it up from the environment (GIBSON 1986; cf. CHEMERO 
2003). To understand this, one should make the meaning of information pro-
cessing in the computational theory of mind more explicit. What kind of 
information is processed? The information in question need not be semantic, 
as not all symbols in computers are about something. The minimal notion 
that could suffice for our purposes is one of information as a degree of 
freedom of a physical medium, called structural information by D. MacKay 
(1969). The number of degrees of freedom, or yes-no questions required to 
exactly describe its current state, is the amount of structural information. As 
long as there are vehicles with multiple degrees of freedom, and as long as 
they are part of causal processes that cause some other vehicles — just as 
some models of computation describe these processes (MIŁKOWSKI 2014) —
there is information processing. This is a very broad notion, as all physical cau-
sation implies information transfer and processing in this sense (COLLIER 1999). 
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The Gibsonian notion of information pickup requires vehicles of struc-
tural information as well. There needs to be some information out there to be 
picked up, and organisms have to be structured so as to be able to change 
their state in response to information. Gibsonians could, however, claim that 
the information is not processed. It is unclear what is meant by this: for 
example, Chemero seems to imply that processing is, in effect, adding more 
and more layers of information, like in Marr’s account of vision (CHEMERO 
2003, 584; cf. MARR 1982). But information processing need not require 
multiple stages of adding more information. In summary: the Gibsonian 
account does not invalidate computationalism at all. So, the objection is a 
red herring. 
4. OBJECTIONS AGAINST COMPUTATIONAL 
FUNCTIONALISM 
CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT COMPUTATIONAL 
Some find (some kinds of) consciousness to be utterly incompatible with 
computationalism, or at least, unexplainable in purely computational terms 
(CHALMERS 1996). The argument is probably due to Leibniz’s thought 
experiment in Monadology (LEIBNIZ 1991). Imagine a brain as large as a mill. 
Now, enter it. Nowhere in the interplay of gears could you find perceptions, 
or qualitative consciousness. Hence, you cannot explain perception mechani-
cally. Of course, this Leibnizian argument appeals only to some physical 
features of mechanisms, but some still seem to think that causation has 
nothing to do with qualitative consciousness.  
The argument, if cogent, is applicable more broadly, not just to computa-
tionalism; it is supposed to defeat reductive physicalism or materialism. For 
this reason, the objection might be dismissed as attacking any scientific pro-
ject which explains consciousness reductively (or functionally). Thus, if the 
objection is correct, there is nothing special about computationalism that is 
under attack in this case. For this reason, any successful defense of a reduc-
tive or functional account of consciousness should focus on the issue of 
consciousness as reductively explainable, rather than on the issue of com-
putation itself, and this goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
Interestingly, however, virtually all current theories of consciousness are 
computational, even those that appeal to quantum processes (HAMEROFF 
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2007). For example, Bernard Baars offers a computational account in terms 
of the global workspace theory (BAARS 1988; cf. also DENNETT 2005), David 
Rosenthal gives an account in terms of higher-level states (ROSENTHAL 2005; 
cf. CLEEREMANS 2005), and Giulio Tononi (2004) explains it in terms of 
minimal information integration. Is there any detailed theory of conscious-
ness that is not already computational? 
John Searle (1992), however, suggests that only a non-computational theory 
of consciousness can succeed. His claim is that consciousness is utterly bio-
logical (so this resembles the objection discussed above in section 2). How 
does this contradict computationalism, given that there might be biological 
computers? Moreover, Searle fails to identify the specific biological powers 
of brains that make them conscious. He just passes the buck to neuroscience, 
which often offers computational accounts. This objection is, therefore, a red 
herring: if computationalism fails, the whole project of a scientific theory of 
consciousness fails with it (elsewhere, I have shown that some apparently 
dualist theories are not only functionalist but also fail to be dualist —
MIŁKOWSKI 2011). 
GENUINE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE 
There are a number of arguments of a form: 
People ψ.  
Computers will never ψ. 
So, artificial intelligence is impossible (or computationalism is false). 
This argument is enthymematic. The conclusion follows with a third 
assumption: if artificial intelligence is possible, then computers will ψ. The 
plausibility of the argument varies from case to case, depending on what you 
substitute for ψ. For years, it was argued that winning in chess is ψ (DREYFUS 
1979), but it turned out to be false. So, unless there is a formal proof, it is 
difficult to treat premise 2 seriously. 
What could be plausibly substituted for ψ? There are many properties of 
biological organisms that seem irrelevant to this argument, including, exactly 
the same energy consumption, having proper names, spatiotemporal loca-
tion, etc. The plausible candidate for substitution is some capacity for 
information-processing. If there is such a human capacity that computers do 
not possess, then the argument is indeed cogent. 
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ONLY PEOPLE CAN SEE THE TRUTH  
This classical anti-computational argument points to the human ability to 
recognize the truth of logical statements that cannot be proven by a computer 
(LUCAS 1961; PENROSE 1989). It is based on the alleged ability of human 
beings to understand that some statements are true, which is purportedly 
impossible for machines. This argument is based on the Gödel proof of in-
completeness of the first-order predicate calculus with complexity sufficient 
to express basic arithmetic. The problem is that this human understanding 
has to be both non-contradictory and certain to qualify as mathematically 
true. But Gödel has shown that, in general, it cannot be decided whether 
a given system is contradictory or not. So, either it is mathematically certain 
that human understanding of mathematics is non-contradictory, which makes 
the argument inconsistent, since it is undecidable and, as such, cannot ever 
be mathematically certain; or the argument simply assumes non-contradic-
tion of human understanding, which makes the argument unsound because 
people make contradictions unknowingly (KRAJEWSKI 2007; PUTNAM 1960). 
COMMON SENSE CANNOT BE FORMALIZED  
Another similar argument points to common sense, which is a particularly 
difficult capacity. The trouble with implementing common sense on machines 
is sometimes called (somewhat misleadingly — SHANAHAN 1997) the frame 
problem (DREYFUS 1972; 1979; WHEELER 2005). Inferential capacities of 
standard AI programs do not seem to follow the practices known to humans, 
and that was supposed to hinder progress in such fields as high-quality 
machine translation (BAR-HILLEL 1964), speech recognition (held to be im-
moral to fund—WEIZENBAUM 1976), and so on. Even if IBM Watson wins in 
Jeopardy!, one may still think it is not enough.  
However, it is not sufficient to say that common sense has still not been 
implemented on a computer in order to reject computationalism as a whole. 
Granted, human-level performance in perception, motor control, or speech 
recognition is still a pipe dream. But this does not mean that these domains 
are, in some sense, non-computational. Although, introspectively, these 
capacities may seem effortless and simple, they may be based on fairly com-
plex information-processing. 
Even if the proponent of computationalism need not require that genuine 
AI be based on a computer simulation of human cognitive processes, he or 
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she still must show that human common sense can be explained computa-
tionally. Whether it can or not is still a matter of debate; however, it is im-
portant to note that the CTM would still remain true even if it was impossible to 
implement common sense on any artificial computer. In other words, the issue 
of the possibility of genuine AI is separate from the issue of whether com-
putationalism is true. The objection is, therefore, again a red herring.3 
5. OBJECTIONS RELATED 
TO PHYSICAL COMPUTATION 
COMPUTERS ARE EVERYWHERE 
At least some plausible theories of physical implementation of computation 
lead to the conclusion that all physical entities are computational (this stance 
is called pancomputationalism — cf. MÜLLER 2014). If this is the case, then the 
computational theory of mind is indeed trivial, as not only are brains computa-
tional, but also cows, black holes, cheese sandwiches, etc. However, a pan-
computationalist may reply by saying that there are several kinds (and 
levels) of computation, and that brains do not execute all kinds of compu-
tation at the same time (MIŁKOWSKI 2007). So not just any computation, but 
some non-trivial kind of computation, is specific to brains. Only the kind of 
pancomputationalism which assumes that everything computes all kinds of 
functions at the same time is catastrophic, as it makes physical computation 
indeed trivial (PUTNAM 1991; SEARLE 1992). But there is no reason to believe 
that such pancomputationalism is true. 
THERE ARE NO COMPUTERS 
Another more radical move is to say that computers do not really exist; 
they are just in the eye of beholder. According to John Searle, the beholder 
decides whether a given physical system is computational, and, therefore, may 
make this decision for virtually everything. Nothing, intrinsically, is a com-
puter. But the body of work on physical computation in the last decade or so 
has been focused on showing why Putnam and Searle were wrong in some 
                        
3 In the shorter version of this paper, presented during Cognitive Science Annual Conference, 
this objection was considered as the most important and successful. However, for the reasons 
given above, I now consider this to be yet another red herring. 
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sense (CHALMERS 2011; PICCININI 2015; MIŁKOWSKI 2013; SHAGRIR 2011; 
SCHEUTZ 1996; CHRISLEY 1994; COPELAND 19961). The contemporary con-
sensus is that computational models can be used to adequately describe 
causal connections in physical systems, and that these models can also be 
falsely ascribed. In other words, computational models are not different in 
kind from any mathematical model used in science. If they are mere sub-
jective metaphors and do not describe reality, then mathematical models in 
physics are subjective as well (MCDERMOTT 2001). 
Intuitively, arguments presented by Searle and Putnam are wrong for 
a very simple reason: why buy a new computer instead of ascribing new 
software to the old one? We know that such ascriptions would be extremely 
cumbersome unless they are systematically justified. Therefore, there must 
be a flaw in such arguments, as the point of ascriptions in this case is that 
they are arbitrary. In contrast, while in computability theory, it is common to 
describe a physical computer, even if it implements a finite state machine 
with a sufficiently large memory, as a universal Turing machine, such ideali-
zation is systematic and non-arbitrary. Even if the technicalities involved are 
indeed interesting, the arguments presented by Searle and Putnam fail to 
establish a conclusion. At the same time, they have sparked a lively discus-
sion on the issue of physical computation that makes computation not just 
a matter of arbitrary descriptions. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have listed and summarized a number of arguments 
against computationalism. Objections in the second section mostly assume 
that all computers have the properties of common, industrially produced 
computers, which is simply incorrect and which underestimates the sheer 
variety of computational machines. The objections in the third section are 
related to an important issue in cognitive science, which is mental represen-
tation. But computationalism is logically compatible with antirepresentatio-
nalism, so these objections miss the point, even if the debate about repre-
sentation remains important in the research on cognition. The objections 
listed in the fourth section associate computationalism with functionalism, 
which assumes that AI models will produce all cognitive capacities. How-
ever, because computationalism need not assume that computation is suf-
ficient for cognition, the issue of genuine AI or computational simulation of 
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consciousness is logically independent from the issue of whether computa-
tionalism is true. Lastly, the fifth section brings general arguments meant to 
show that either computers do not exist, or that everything is a computer. Both 
claims have recently been shown to be very contentious or to demonstrate that 
a stronger version of computationalism was assumed in the debate. 
Hence, the take-home lesson is that there is no good reason to think that the 
brain, or, more broadly speaking, the nervous system is not a computer. But it 
is not a mere computer: It is physically embedded in its environment and 
interacts physically with its body, and, for that, it also needs a peripheral 
nervous system and cognitive representations. Yet there is nothing that denies 
computationalism here. Most criticisms of computationalism therefore fail. 
Adhering to them is probably a matter of ideology rather than rational debate. 
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OBJECTIONS TO COMPUTATIONALISM: A SURVEY 
S u m m a r y  
In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are 
computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practi-
cally all the popular objections are based on uncharitable (or simply incorrect) interpretations of 
the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro) 
science, and non-trivial. 
 
 
ZARZUTY WOBEC KOMPUTACJONIZMU — PRZEGLĄD 
S t r e s z c z e n i e  
W artykule Autor przyjrzał się typowym zastrzeżeniom przeciwko twierdzeniu, że mózgi to 
komputery, a ściślej — mechanizmy przetwarzania informacji. Pokazując, że praktycznie wszyst-
kie popularne obiekcje są oparte na nieżyczliwych (lub po prostu niepoprawnych) interpretacjach 
tego twierdzenia, uznaje, że twierdzenie to prawdopodobnie będzie prawdziwe, istotne dla współ-
czesnej (neuro)kognitywistyki i nietrywialne. 
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